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Observing another person performing an action can lead to a false memory of having per-
formed the action oneself – the observation-inflation effect. In the experimental paradigm,
participants first perform or do not perform simple actions, and then observe another
person perform some of these actions. The observation-inflation effect is found when
participants later remember performing actions that they have merely observed. In this
case, self and other are confused in action memory. We examined social conditions of this
self-other confusion when remembering actions, specifically whether the effect depends
on the observed actor’s group membership. In our experiment, we manipulated group
membership based on physical appearance, specifically complexion of the hands. Fair-
skinned participants observed either an in-group (i.e., fair-skinned) or an out-group (i.e.,
dark-skinned) actor. Our results revealed that the observed actor’s group membership mod-
erated the observation-inflation effect: False memories were significantly reduced when
the actor was from the out-group (vs. in-group). We found no difference to a control con-
dition in which the actor wore black gloves, suggesting that distinctiveness of perceptual
or sensory features alone (due to the out-group member’s dark skin) is not critical. We dis-
cuss these findings in light of social-neuroscience studies demonstrating the impact of an
observed person’s group membership on motor simulation. Overall, our findings suggest
that action memory can be affected by a ubiquitous feature of people’s social perception,
that is, group-based social categorization of others.
Keywords: self-other confusion, group membership, action memory, false memory, motor simulation, perceptual
distinctiveness
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you watch a cooking-show on television while you are
preparing dinner yourself. Sometime later, after you have left the
house, you find yourself wondering whether you actually switched
off the stove. Clearly, correctly remembering whether one has per-
formed an action is crucial for successfully managing everyday life.
Did you just observe the TV-cook switching off his or her stove,
or did you do it yourself? Recent research shows that observing
another person’s action can lead people to mistakenly remember
that they have performed the action themselves (Lindner et al.,
2010; Schain et al., 2012). The present research was conducted
to investigate conditions under which such false self-attributions
of actions are more or less likely to occur. We focused on social
conditions, specifically the observed actor’s membership in the
observer’s in-group (vs. out-group).
In the initial experimental demonstration of the effect, Lind-
ner et al. (2010) asked participants to perform or to read simple
action statements, like “Unlock the lock” or “Shake the bottle.”
Afterwards, participants were asked to observe another person per-
form some of the actions they had and some of the actions they had
not previously performed themselves. Two weeks later, a surprise
source-memory test revealed that observation of other-performed
actions had inflated false memories of self-performance. Thus, this
effect has been referred to as observation inflation (see also imag-
ination inflation, i.e., false memories of self-performance from
imagination; Garry et al., 1996; Goff and Roediger, 1998).
The observation-inflation effect reveals the profoundly social
nature of memory inasmuch as it entails a confusion of self and
other in recollecting actions. Thus, this phenomenon is a prime
example of how our contact with the social world affects our
memory (see Echterhoff and Hirst, 2009; Hirst and Echterhoff,
2012). Because we constantly observe others performing actions,
there are countless occasions that potentially could trigger subse-
quent false self-attributions of actions. But do we indiscriminately
incorporate others’ actions into our own action memories? Or do
such self-other confusions depend on social characteristics of the
observed actor?
Research on social perception and interpersonal processes sug-
gests that we are more likely to adopt, or to be affected by, the
experiences of others who are more (vs. less) close and similar to
ourselves (Aron et al., 2004). A key component involved in feelings
of closeness and similarity is another person’s group membership.
One of the first things we do when we are observing another per-
son – often automatically and spontaneously – is to categorize
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her or him (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). Using cues like a
person’s age, gender, and race we sort people into different social
groups that are either like us (i.e., the in-group) or not like us (i.e.,
the out-group).
Regarding the present phenomenon, there is ample evidence
that people more readily adopt and incorporate the inner states of
in-group (vs. out-group) members (Echterhoff et al., 2009; Cikara
et al., 2011). This bias has been found for affects and emotions (Xu
et al., 2009; Avenanti et al., 2010; Azevedo et al., in press), but also
for memory (Echterhoff et al., 2008, in press).
So far, only few studies have examined whether and how mem-
ory for another person’s features and actions is influenced by
the person’s group membership. For example, people are bet-
ter in remembering in-group than out-group faces (see Meissner
and Brigham, 2001; Young et al., 2012), and memory for neg-
ative out-group behavior is better than for positive out-group
behavior (Howard and Rothbart, 1980). Furthermore, people are
more likely to confuse the sources of recalled statements when
the sources belong to the same (vs. a different) ethnic or racial
group (Taylor et al., 1978; Stangor et al., 1992). With the present
research we specifically examined whether false action memo-
ries from observation also depend on the observed others’ group
membership.
While the impact of group membership on action memory
in general and false action memory in particular has not been
investigated, there are potentially relevant findings outside the
memory literature. Studies on action perception hint at a con-
sistent pattern between observation of others’ actions and their
group membership. In one study, Müller et al. (2011) employed
the social Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003) to measure coor-
dinated action between interaction partners. It was found that
participants’ reaction times were decelerated when interacting
with an out-group (vs. in-group) member, indicating that co-
representations of actions are only formed when coordinating with
in-group members. Similarly, people exhibit increased cortical
sensitivity when observing errors in action execution of someone
who is similar (vs. dissimilar; Carp et al., 2009; Newman-Norlund
et al., 2009; Kang et al., 2010). Furthermore, Gutsell and Inzlicht
(2010) found that motor simulation during action observation
was substantially decreased when observing out-group (vs. in-
group) members. Taken together, actions of out-group members
tend to be processed less preferentially and represented less readily
in the observer than actions of in-group members. Accordingly,
the potential of observed actions to induce false action memories
in the observer should be less pronounced after observation of an
out-group (vs. in-group) member.
The present study was designed to test this prediction. We
manipulated a person’s group membership by presenting either
a fair-skinned (in-group) or a dark-skinned (out-group) actor to
fair-skinned observers and predicted that a self-other confusion
in action memory should be accentuated after observation of an
in-group member, but reduced after observation of an out-group
member.
A reduced observation-inflation effect after observation of an
out-group member could be due to mere perceptual distinctive-
ness of the dark-skinned hands. To control for this possibility, par-
ticipants in a control group observed an actor wearing black gloves
(see Avenanti et al., 2010; Azevedo et al., in press). Whereas an
approach drawing on perceptual distinctiveness predicts the least
false memories after observation of a person wearing black gloves,
an intergroup-bias approach suggests a reduced observation-
inflation effect exclusively after observing an out-group member,
but not after observing a person wearing black gloves.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-eight students at the University of Münster (mean age= 21.9,
SD= 4.7, 11 men) participated in this study for partial course
credit. All participants were fair-skinned. The study was approved
by the local ethics committee. The guidelines of the Declaration
of Helsinki and standards of the American Psychological Asso-
ciation were followed. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
DESIGN
A 2 (observation, Phase 2: observed vs. not observed)× 3 (group
membership of observed actor, Phase 2: in-group vs. out-group
vs. control) design was used, with the first variable manipulated
within participants. The main dependent measure was the relative
frequency of false performed-responses for actions that were only
read but not performed in Phase 1.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
We adapted the procedure introduced by Lindner et al. (2010).
The experiment was computer-based and consisted of two ses-
sions, separated by a 2-week interval. Participants were tested
individually in both sessions.
In Phase 1, for each participant 40 action statements were ran-
domly chosen from a pool of 60 action statements and presented
at the center of a 22-inch TFT-LCD display in a random order.
Half of the action statements had to be performed, the other half
were only read. Assignment of items to these two types of encod-
ing was also randomized. At the beginning of each trial, the name
of a specific object (e.g., Lock) appeared on the screen. Objects
were hidden behind a visual cover, thus participants waited until
the experimenter had placed the required object in front of them.
Next, a perform instruction (Please perform) or a read instruc-
tion (Please read) appeared on the screen and was followed by the
specific action statement (e.g., Unlock the lock!). Participants now
performed or read out the action statement once before moving
on to the next trial.
In Phase 2, half of the action statements performed in Phase 1
and half of the action statements read in Phase 1 were randomly
chosen and presented. Each presentation of an action statement
was followed by a corresponding video showing the specific action
repeatedly over the course of 15 s. To maintain participants’ atten-
tion, an observation task was introduced: Participants were asked
to count the number of action repetitions after each video and
enter their final count. Overall, each action statement and the cor-
responding video were presented five times in a random order,
resulting in a total of 100 trials for Phase 2.
In the in-group condition, videos of the torso, forearms, and
hands of a German, fair-skinned female actress (24 years) were
presented from a second-person perspective (352 kb/s, 960× 530
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pixels, see Figure 1). In the out-group condition, actions were
performed by a Sri Lankan, dark-skinned female actor (21 years,
see Figure 2). A pretest (N = 17 women; mean age= 22.18;
SD= 2.19) confirmed that the different ethnicities could be eas-
ily derived from the videos. Participants rated sample videos
with regard to the estimated likability for several countries and
regions on a seven-point Likert scale (one being very unlikely,
seven being very likely). Compared to the in-group actress, the
out-group actress was perceived as significantly less likely to be
from Germany [out-group: M = 3.1, SD= 1.8; in-group: M = 6.2,
SD= 1.1; t (16)= 5.83, p< 0.001, d = 1.41], and more likely to
be from South Asia [out-group: M = 5.1, SD= 1.8; in-group:
M = 2.5, SD= 1.2; t (16)= 6.75, p< 0.001, d = 1.64]. For the con-
trol condition, the actor (22 years) wore black gloves during action
performance. The actor’s actual skin color (fair) was not visible at
any time (see Figure 3).
Two weeks later, the 40 old action statements were randomly
presented in a surprise source-memory test along with 20 new
action statements. Participants indicated for each action statement
whether it was performed, read, or not presented during Phase 1.
FIGURE 1 | Screenshot of action video Unlock the lock! presented in
the in-group condition.
FIGURE 2 | Screenshot of action video Unlock the lock! presented in
the out-group condition.
Our hypotheses refer to false performed-responses, that is, per-
formed-responses to actions only read in Phase 1. An observation-
inflation effect was defined as a significant increase in false
performed-responses for items observed compared to items not
observed in Phase 2. Accordingly, the magnitude of the effect
was defined as the difference in false performed-responses between
items observed and not observed in Phase 2.
RESULTS
To test our hypotheses, we ran planned pairwise comparisons
(Type I error threshold= 0.05). Accordingly, p-values are one-
tailed.
Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations of false
performed-responses for the three experimental conditions (in-
group actor vs. out-group actor vs. control). We found significant
observation-inflation effects in all three conditions, the in-group
condition, t (19)= 6.40, p< 0.001, d= 1.43, the out-group condi-
tion, t (18)= 6.32, p< 0.001, d= 1.44, and the control condition,
t (18)= 4.17, p< 0.001, d= 0.96, respectively. Thus, all partici-
pants were prone to falsely claiming that they had performed
actions themselves when in fact they had only observed another
person performing these actions.
Importantly, the magnitude of the effect, that is, the dif-
ference in false performed-responses between observed and not
observed items, was a function of the actor’s group membership
(see Figure 4). As predicted, planned comparisons indicated that
the effect was significantly lower in the out-group than in the
in-group condition, t (37)= 2.06, p= 0.02, d= 0.65. No signifi-
cant difference was found between the control condition and the
in-group condition, t (37)= 0.83, p= 0.21, d= 0.27, or between
the control condition and the out-group condition, t (36)= 0.84,
p= 0.20, d= 0.27.
We also conducted additional analyses to examine the role of
other alternative processes (differences in task motivation, atten-
tion, or a general response bias) that could account for the present
findings. First, we analyzed performance on the counting task that
was administered in Phase 2 (that is, the counting of observed
action repetitions). Mean accuracy rates varied between 0.79 and
0.85, and did not differ between the three experimental conditions,
FIGURE 3 | Screenshot of action video Unlock the lock! presented in
the control condition.
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Table 1 | Mean proportion of performed-responses as a function of encoding in Phase 1, observation in Phase 2, and observation group.
Encoding, Phase 1 Observation, Phase 2
In-group Out-group Control: black gloves
Observed Not observed Observed Not observed Observed Not observed
Performed 0.79 (0.17) 0.46 (0.15) 0.80 (0.14) 0.56 (0.23) 0.72 (0.16) 0.58 (0.21)
Read 0.27 (0.18) 0.06 (0.08) 0.18 (0.15) 0.05 (0.10) 0.24 (0.17) 0.08 (0.10)
Not presented – 0.02 (0.04) – 0.01 (0.02) – 0.01 (0.03)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Proportions represent the frequency of performed-responses divided by the number of all responses for a corresponding
item type.
FIGURE 4 | Magnitude of the observation-inflation effect as a function
of group membership of the observed actor. Error bars represent the
standard error of mean.
F(2, 51)= 1.34, p= 0.27, ηp2= 0.05. This finding is inconsistent
with the notion that the reduced observation-inflation effect in
the out-group condition is due to decreased task motivation or
visual attention, which could impair source memory in general.
Furthermore, the rate of false performed-responses to com-
pletely new items (not presented in Phase 1 and not observed in
Phase 2) was close to zero, ranging from 0.01 to 0.02 in all the
three experimental groups. Thus, differences in a general response
bias toward claiming actions as self-performed cannot account for
the difference in observation inflation found in the earlier main
analysis.
DISCUSSION
Observation of another person performing a simple action can
lead to a false memory of having performed this action oneself,
that is, the observation-inflation effect (Lindner et al., 2010). The
present study extends this initial finding inasmuch as it shows
that the ethnic group membership of the observed person – con-
veyed by mere skin color – has an impact on the magnitude of
the observation-inflation effect. Compared to an in-group (i.e.,
a fair-skinned) actor, the observation of an out-group (i.e., a
dark-skinned) actor led to a significant reduction in false self-
attributions of action performance after two weeks. As predicted
from a social-psychological account of intergroup bias, such a
reduction was not found for the observation of an actor wearing
black gloves.
Our findings resonate well with research on reduced motor sim-
ulation of actions of out-group (vs. in-group) members. Building
on research on mirror-neuron activity and shared motor represen-
tations, Lindner et al. (2010) hypothesized that motor simulation
during action observation might be the core mechanism behind
the observation-inflation effect. Apparently, people do not co-
represent or share out-group members’ actions to the same extent
than in-group members’ actions. Indeed, an EEG-study by Gutsell
and Inzlicht (2010) suggests that covert vicarious action perfor-
mance depends on an observed actor’s group membership. These
authors asked fair-skinned Canadians to either perform a target
action themselves or to observe an in-group member (Caucasian)
vs. an out-group member (African-Canadian, East-, or South-
Asian) performing this same action. In these different conditions,
they measured suppression of EEG activity in the mu frequency
bandwidth over the primary motor cortex, which is thought
to index the degree of motor simulation. Gutsell and Inzlicht
found that both, performing an action oneself and observing
an in-group member performing an action, elicited mu suppres-
sion. However, there was no significant mu suppression, that is,
engagement in motor simulation, when observing an out-group
member.
Furthermore, our results for the black-glove control condi-
tion are consistent with findings by Avenanti et al. (2010). These
authors asked fair- and dark-skinned participants to observe the
hands of either a fair-skinned, a dark-skinned, or an (artificially)
violet-skinned actor experiencing pain (vs. no pain). The findings
revealed sensorimotor resonance, indicating neuronal simulation
of the observed pain, for observation of the in-group member,
but not of the out-group member. They also found that observers
simulated the pain of the violet-skinned actor, but to a smaller
extent than for the in-group member. Analogous to this finding,
in our study, the observers might have felt uncertain about the
group membership of the person wearing black gloves. Hence,
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the observation of the glove-wearing actor would elicit only an
intermediate level of motor simulation.
How can biased motor simulation account for the present
memory effects? The bulk of the motor simulation literature,
including studies on intergroup differences (Xu et al., 2009;
Avenanti et al., 2010; Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2010; Azevedo et al.,
in press), has focused on the processes ongoing during obser-
vation. However, a few studies have shown that motor rep-
resentations from observation are reactivated during retrieval
(Senkfor et al., 2002; Wutte et al., 2012). Consistent with a
motor-simulation account of the present false memory effect,
Wutte et al. (2012) found overlapping neural activation in motor
areas when participants remembered self-performed and observed
movements.
Our findings extend the common understanding of the
emergence of false memories of self-performance. Explanations
of related false action memories, specifically the imagination-
inflation effect (Goff and Roediger, 1998), have invoked the mis-
attribution due to similarity of sensory features. According to
this account, which draws on the source-monitoring framework
(Johnson et al., 1993), non-self-performed actions (e.g., merely
imagined actions) are attributed to self-performance to the extent
that the sensory features of action memories from the compet-
ing sources are similar (vs. dissimilar). For instance, after vividly
imagining the action of shaking a bottle, people may later remem-
ber perceptual details and features, such as shape and color of the
bottle, or fingers grasping the bottle; because these features are
similar to the features contained in memories of self-performed
actions, an originally imagined action may be misattributed to
previous self-performance. Conversely, by this view, the availabil-
ity of distinctive perceptual features at retrieval prevents such
misattributions.
Our findings are not easily reconciled with this account.
Because hands wearing black gloves are more salient and percep-
tually more distinct from fair-skinned hands than dark-skinned
hands, the sensory-feature account of misattribution would pre-
dict that this condition results in the lowest rate of false action
memories. However, observation inflation was lowest in the out-
group condition, indicating that group membership rather than
perceptual distinctiveness was critical in forming false memories
of self-performance. This result is in line with earlier findings
(Lindner et al., 2010, Exp. 3).
Still, whereas similarity of perceptual features is not sufficient
to account for the pattern of results that we found in the current
study, the distinctiveness of such features may still moderate the
effect under certain circumstances. Schain et al. (2012) manipu-
lated perceptual distinctiveness by using the actor’s face as a visual
identity cue. They found that observation inflation is diminished
when a central identity cue, that is, the actor’s face, was available
and attended to by observers. In light of these previous findings,
one might wonder why the non-self cues employed here, dark skin
or black gloves, did not eliminate false self-attributions to a greater
extent. It could allow observers to apply a rule such as “I did not
wear black gloves/my skin is not that dark, so it was not me who
performed this action” to avoid false self-attributions.
This issue can be resolved by arguing that the face is probably a
more effective and distinctive identity cue than are skin color or a
piece of clothing. The face offers various features (e.g., color of the
eyes, size of the nose, shape of the forehead, etc.), which collectively
signal a Not-me-response. Also, the detection and identification of
others’ faces are exceptionally important in social development
and social cognition (Zebrowitz, 1997), and humans, including
newborns, have a pronounced tendency to direct their visual atten-
tion to others’ faces (Johnson and Morton, 1991). However, for
engagement and modulation of motor simulation to occur, skin
color has not to be highly salient – the observers’ categorization
into an in-group vs. an out-group member is sufficient to alter
shared motor representations in the observer.
To conclude, in the present study, we focused on physical sim-
ilarity in terms of skin color to manipulate group membership.
Future studies should examine whether our results generalize to
other cues of group membership that are not conveyed by physical
appearance and to other types of group membership than eth-
nicity. For instance, would we find the same bias when ethnicity is
conveyed solely by verbal labels, such as first names that are typical
for specific groups? And will observation inflation be higher if the
actor shares, for example, the same values, the same profession, or
the same interest as the observer?
With this study we have shown that people are less prone to con-
fuse self and other in action memory when they have observed an
out-group (vs. in-group) member. As we have argued, our findings
are not easily explained by the similarity or distinctiveness of per-
ceptual features, but are consistent with an account of intergroup
biases in motor simulation. Future studies should seek further
evidence for the underlying mechanisms in this fascinating new
domain of memory research.
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